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s a result of competition the telecommunica-
tions sector today consists of a multitude of
networks. Also, many telecommunications service
providers own partial networks. With the exception
of private networks, all of these have access to each
other or are interconnected to form a network of
networks that is usable by all service providers.
Without access and interconnection such networks
and competition between them would hardly have
spread so quickly. Here, interconnection shall mean
that two networks are linked to provide call origina-
tion, transit and termination for each other and the
networks operate at the same level of network hier-
archy.In contrast,access refers to the case,where the
networks operate at different hierarchical levels and
only one network uses the other to originate or ter-
minate calls.
Access and interconnection benefit consumers and
the competitive process. They are necessary for car-
riers to provide ubiquitous service and enable end-
users to call anybody and be called by anybody (the
any-to-any principle) without having to sign up with
a system-wide network monopolist. Being able to be
called by or call more people increases a subscriber’s
utility and thereby provides a network externality
that access and interconnection help secure. Access
and interconnection also help reduce market power.
They lower barriers to entry, because entrants need
not establish full-coverage networks. Furthermore,
in the absence of access and interconnection,owners
of narrow monopolies could make use of network
externalities (and economies of scope) to leverage
their market power into other telecommunications
markets. In contrast, interconnection could, among
sufficiently symmetric competing networks,also pro-
vide incentives for collusion.
Access and interconnection are indispensable for
the functioning of a competitive telecommunica-
tions market. However, to the extent that they cre-
ate network externalities,the market is likely to pro-
vide too little of them. In addition, the originally
dominating network providers have few incentives
to give competitors access to their facilities, espe-
cially to those that are hard or impossible to dupli-
cate.1 Antitrust policy could deal with such bottle-
neck issues in principle, but actually implementing
the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” involves
ongoing supervision and pricing assessments that
resemble regulation. In an already regulated
telecommunications sector such additional regula-
tion therefore comes naturally. Today, access and
interconnection pricing are a paramount policy con-
cern of telecommunications regulators.
The structure of this article emphasizes the differ-
ence between an access model and an interconnec-
tion model or, in more accepted language, between
one-way access and two-way access.One way access
(or the access model) concerns the provision of bot-
tleneck inputs by an incumbent network provider to
new entrants,while two-way access (or the intercon-
nection model) concerns reciprocal access between
two networks that have to rely upon each other to
terminate calls. The distinction arose for two rea-
sons. First the one-way access problem is the provi-
sion of a monopoly input by a vertically separated
or a vertically integrated monopolist, while the two-
way access problem is the coordination of an essen-
tial input between two firms in more or less sym-
metric situations. Second, as competition in the
telecommunications industry matures, the two-way
access problem becomes increasingly relevant as it
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1 While incumbents with almost 100 percent market share have lit-
tle to gain from the network externalities provided by entrants,
entrants have everything to gain from the network externalities
provided by the incumbent.One-way Access
Issue: Treatment of bottleneck inputs
The one-way access problem concerns an upstream
bottleneck input owned by a vertically integrated
dominant incumbent operator (“incumbent”) and
essential for non-integrated entrants competing with
the incumbent in a downstream market. One-way
access is of continuing concern, as long as incum-
bents dominate the direct access to the subscriber
(the “last mile”). Hopes have been that convergence
of mobile and fixed network services would solve the
issue but the emergence of fiber to the home may
keep it alive for a long time to come. The one-way
access problem is closely linked to the essential facil-
ities doctrine in antitrust. It becomes an antitrust or
regulatory problem if the nonintegrated firms can-
not reasonably duplicate the bottleneck facility and
if the integrated firm is not willing to let them use it
at reasonable terms.The network externality makes
bottlenecks particularly troublesome in telecommu-
nications because localized bottlenecks could be
used effectively to exclude competitors from large
markets.This would be less so under vertical separa-
tion, which turns the bottleneck issue into one of
fairly straightforward input monopoly and which has
some empirical relevance, particularly in the U.S.
after the 1984 AT&T divestiture.Regulation of long-
distance access charges of the divested Bell
Operating Companies nevertheless remained con-
troversial because of cost allocation and cross-subsi-
dization issues.
Pricing rules
From the perspective of policy makers, access
charges could help achieve a number of tasks,such as
encourage the right amount of downstream entry
and upstream bypass, encourage efficient network
investment and network utilization, while being
manageable. The tasks are conveniently aggregated
in social surplus under the Ramsey approach to
access pricing taken by Laffont and Tirole (1993).
Ramsey prices maximize welfare subject to a break-
even constraint on the regulated firm(s). However,
applying the Ramsey approach to access pricing by
vertically integrated incumbents leads to potentially
complex results, as they incorporate the incumbent’s
budget constraint, demand relationships, cost rela-
tionships and types of competition. This complexity
reflects the complicated nature of the problem and is
the price to be paid for general rather than partial
optimization.While regulators could try and approx-
imately implement such complex Ramsey pricing for-
mulas, there have been no known attempts to do so.
This may be as much attributable to interest group
influences opposed to the resulting markups of prices
on costs as to lack of information about elasticities,
costs and competitive reactions and the inability to
solve complex conceptual problems. Economists and
practitioners have therefore proposed simpler ways
to determine access charges (and final goods prices)
with desirable properties, including:
– the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR),
also known as Baumol-Willig rule,
– cost-based access charges,
– price caps for access and/or end-users,
– deregulation of end-user prices.
Taking Ramsey prices as the efficient but impractical
standard, each of its alternatives simplifies or
neglects some of its properties.The ECPR takes final
goods prices as given and deducts costs saved by the
incumbent downstream. Cost-based access charges
use proportional rather than differentiated markups.
Price caps substitute imperfect incentives for control
of markups but, in the case of global price caps with
a single basket of access and end-user services,could
approximate Ramsey prices. Last, end-user price
deregulation would substitute for downstream
Ramsey prices and would work well with access
price caps.
All three principal access-pricing methods – Ramsey
pricing, the ECPR and cost-based pricing – have
their advantages and drawbacks. Ramsey prices and
a theoretically clean ECPR require detailed infor-
mation about demands and competitive interactions
in addition to the cost information required for cost-
based access charges. Global price caps or access
price caps can reduce these information require-
ments but will only approximate the desired result at
best. In principle, the ECPR will provide the best
entry signals if downstream prices are optimal and if
bottlenecks cannot be bypassed, while cost-based
access charges will provide the correct bypass signals
for the access facility and will work best if down-
stream competition is intense or if other policy
instruments correct for downstream distortions.
Increasing regulated access charges over time in a
predetermined way could provide incentives for
entrants to build bypass facilities and could well
reflect increased downstream competition.
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In practice cost-based access charges with small
common cost markups have come to prevail world-
wide.This holds,for example,for the EU and the US.
The ECPR has widespread relevance for resale of
services. It has also been tried, but was ultimately
rejected by the Privy Council as highest court, in
New Zealand. A major insight from the ECPR is
that, in the absence of a second instrument (tax),
access charges may have to mimic the incumbent’s
retail price structure if the regulator imposes a par-
ticular retail price structure (such as geographically
uniform prices) on the incumbent. However, a sec-
ond instrument would be preferable for achieving
noncompetitive goals, such as universal service.
Access price caps are used in the UK and, for long-
distance access charges, in the US. Given the contro-
versies and difficulties in finding acceptable methods
of regulating access prices, new approaches are
worth looking at, including those relevant for two-
way access.
Two-way Access
Issues: Collusion versus exclusion
Two-way access has been around for a long time in
the form of international calling arrangements
between countries (settlements) and the arrange-
ments between adjacent local exchange companies
in the US.These involve carriers that do not compete
with each other. In contrast, the two-way access
problems we are concerned with here occur between
competing carriers operating at the same level of
integration and offering local and long-distance ser-
vices. Thus, these firms use each other’s bottleneck
inputs and compete with each other.The issues aris-
ing in this context are collusion and exclusion.While
collusion is more of an issue in symmetric intercon-
nection relationships, exclusion is more likely by a
large network provider interconnecting with a small
network provider.
Interconnection pricing
In the context of international calls between coun-
tries with different monopoly providers, the inter-
connection pricing problem in the non-cooperative
setting burns down to the pricing of two inputs (ter-
mination on each side) at their respective monopoly
prices. Combined with their retail monopolies this
leads to double marginalization and therefore (even
in the symmetric case) fails to generate a joint prof-
it maximum. Explicit cooperation in this case can
lead to lower interconnection prices that reduce
double marginalization, while independent behav-
ior increases the problem (Carter and Wright 1994).
When firms offer complementary services their col-
lusion is socially desirable. In contrast, if the end-
user services are close substitutes and the firms pro-
viding mutual interconnection therefore compete
with each other we would expect cooperation
between them to be potentially harmful.One of the
main questions in the literature on two-way access
has hence been whether interconnection prices can
be used as instruments to facilitate such harmful
collusion.
The answer has been that perfect collusion through
reciprocal access charges is possible,if firms compete
in linear end-user prices downstream. This result
holds because an increase in reciprocal access prices
increases marginal costs relevant for end-user pric-
ing but also increases revenues from incoming calls
(Armstrong,1998a;Laffont,Rey and Tirole [L-R-T],
1998). The result loses its relevance under two-part
pricing, though, and two-part pricing holds for many
telecommunications services.
Bill-and-keep and the value of incoming calls
While a lot of the early work on two-way accesss
concentrated on the collusion issue, the new prob-
lems,such as those raised by replacement of conven-
tional telephone networks by IP-based networks (so-
called Next Generation Networks or NGNs), shifted
the focus of the discussion.
In the past, the interconnection arrangements
between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were of
the bill-and-keep kind,meaning that reciprocal access
services were provided free of charge.These so-called
“peering arrangements” have induced some econo-
mists,such as Brock (1995),to call for similar arrange-
ments among competing telecommunications net-
work providers. More recently, the Internet arrange-
ments have changed. Now, peering without charge
only continues between core ISPs, while non-core
ISPs have to pay. Using a non-cooperative bargaining
framework to analyze the negotiations between a
core ISP and other ISPs, Milgrom, Mitchell and
Srinagesh (2000) hypothesize that in early stages of
the Internet network size did not convey a major bar-
gaining advantage so that bill-and-keep arrangements
would be likely outcomes independent of relativesizes. In contrast, in the later stage, with increasing
market penetration the larger ISPs gain a bargaining
advantage over smaller ones because their own cus-
tomers value outside communications less highly
than before. The resulting peering arrangements
(and the lack thereof) are efficient, as long as there
are sufficiently many core ISPs.
The justification for bill-and-keep interconnection
pricing in telecommunications has traditionally
included the savings of transaction and measure-
ment cost and the failure of per-minute rates to
reflect the truly relevant capacity costs of networks
(which are zero most of the time and quite high dur-
ing peak periods). In particular, if these reasons had
some importance and if traffic were symmetric bill-
and-keep would be a desirable approach for the pric-
ing of telecommunications interconnection.2 By now,
however,the value of calls to the receiving party and
the ability of the receiving network to charge its sub-
scribers for the resulting utility increase has become
a potentially much more powerful justification of
bill-and-keep, even under asymmetric traffic.
This reason had been neglected in the literature,
until recent practice in the US showed that entrants
could turn the seeming disadvantage of high inter-
connection charges into an advantage by concentrat-
ing on subscribers with more incoming than outgo-
ing calls. If both the caller and the receiver benefit
from a call they should both contribute to its pay-
ment (DeGraba, 2000a; Hermalin and Katz, 2001).
Hence, each network can cover the termination cost
it incurs through a call from another network by
charging its own subscriber, who has been the called
party.This can take the form of usage charges, as for
wireless calls in the US, or additional fixed monthly
fees. While the ability of the receiving network to
estimate receiver demand for incoming calls could
be limited, competition for subscribers could lead to
efficient prices for incoming calls. In contrast, net-
works usually have a monopoly position with respect
to call termination, resulting in distorted pricing
under caller pays principles.
Unfortunately, there do not seem to exist demand
estimates for incoming calls.3 But since we regularly
answer the phone, the value is obviously positive on
average. Nevertheless, values in both directions are
unlikely to be equal (on average). Retail prices to
caller and receiver should therefore depend on the
two demands and on the sum of originating and ter-
minating costs, but not on their cost share. However,
the welfare-maximizing interconnection charges
depend on each network’s costs, because they influ-
ence retail prices (Hermalin and Katz, 2001). So,
from a valuation perspective, bill-and-keep would
not necessarily be efficient but neither would any of
the other pricing approaches,such as those discussed
above for one-way access. Compared to those, bill-
and-keep may have an important disadvantage,
known as the “hot potato” problem, meaning that a
network provider will try to hand over a call to the
other network as quickly as possible and thereby
save on network expansion. In order to avoid this
kind of free-riding on other networks and to induce
optimal network investment, DeGraba’s (2000b)
COBAK (central office bill-and-keep) proposal
restricts the bill-and-keep portion of a call to the ter-
mination of calls from the last central office to the
called party, while the sending network would be
responsible for transport and switching until that
point. This suggestion also addresses the conjecture
that incoming calls are, on average, valued less than
outgoing calls (DeGraba, 2002).
A major issue with the value of incoming calls is that
usually the calling party pays for the call,resulting in
a call externality from being called, which is hard to
internalize by the two parties. Switching to a receiv-
er-pays regime would eliminate that externality but
replace it with a call externality for the caller.Thus,a
payment by both parties would be required for elim-
inating that externality. In this case the receiver pay-
ment would be associated with a discount on termi-
nation charges (Jeon,Laffont and Tirole,2004,in the
context of two-part tariffs downstream). By provid-
ing network providers with an incentive to institute
such a reception payment bill-and-keep is likely to
reduce call externalities (DeGraba, 2002).
Thus, bill-and-keep, as amended by the COBAK
proposal, has a number of advantages over other
pricing rules. This would, in particular, hold for
NGNs. Something similar to COBAK is already
applied to broadband access networks. Extending
this to narrowband would help eliminate the cur-
rently existing and growing arbitrage problems and
competitive distortions between conventional tele-
phony and VoIP.It would help establish a compatible
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interconnection system for all networks and all ser-
vices.At the same time,it would get the regulator out
of ongoing price regulation of interconnection
charges, because the remaining transit networks not
covered by bill-and-keep are already competitive or
on their way towards competition.The main regula-
tory tasks would then concern decisions on the rele-
vant “central offices”, between which and final users
bill-and-keep would hold. In particular, when it
comes to conversion of circuit-switched by packet-
switched networks, those offices could be quite far
away from end-users and could be located at inter-
connection points with core networks.
Competitive bottlenecks and discriminatory pricing
between on-net and off-net calls 
Besides two-way interconnection in an NGN world
the main current interconnection problem in many
countries is that of mobile termination.It concerns the
high termination prices mobile telecommunications
carriers charge fixed network providers and each
other.This problem has its roots partially in competi-
tive bottlenecks, partially in discriminatory pricing.
Armstrong (1998b, 2002) terms the problem of
monopoly over call termination one of competitive
bottlenecks because it can happen under full compe-
tition between networks for subscribers. Because the
receiving network (usually) has a monopoly for ter-
mination to the subscriber being called, it can charge
a monopoly price for termination. If callers only have
average information about termination charges and
do not know which network the receiver subscribes to
the termination charges in small networks may even
exceed monopoly prices.Free entry can lead to biases
in favor of small firms and a dissipation of the result-
ing monopoly rents in the form of low monthly fees or
free phones or the like (Wright 2002). Small firms,
however,are at a disadvantage,when it comes to price
discrimination between on-net and off-net calls.
Originally introduced as “Friends and Family” by
MCI in the 1980s, discrimination between calls that
terminate within the call originating network (on-
network calls) and those that terminate on the other
network (off-network calls) has spread and is now
common, for example, in the European mobile tele-
phone industry. In a symmetric market equilibrium
the on-net retail price decreases with substitutability
and with the access price. If substitutability is suffi-
ciently small,the off-net price increases in the access
charge.The main insight of L-R-T (1998) in this con-
text is to show the existence and working of price-
induced network externalities. Belonging to a larger
network allows a consumer to do more lower priced
on-network calls. Thus, a high access charge that
leads to a high off-network retail price hurts a net-
work with a small market share. A full coverage
incumbent can squeeze a small coverage entrant
through a high access price. This is important for
access charge regulation and for regulatory permis-
sion of price discrimination in the retail market.
In this discriminatory pricing environment, an
increase in access charge may actually increase retail
competition, because an access charge increase dri-
ves a wedge between the marginal cost of an off-net
call as opposed to an on-net call.High access charges
therefore are not necessarily a good collusion device.
Rather they induce firms to increase their market
shares in order to have more on-network calls
(avoiding the access charge). In a second best sense,
therefore, the price discrimination can improve wel-
fare by reducing double markups (on access and
retail) if networks are sufficiently differentiated.This
will happen, because the high off-net price will not
have many users. The problem is that, at the same
time, the incumbent could foreclose a small entrant.
This problem suggests that a regulator would want to
forbid such price discrimination (by the incumbent),
when competition is in its infancy, while such price
discrimination would be advisable,once entrants are
viable (having large coverage sunk networks).
Under two-part tariffs and price discrimination
downstream, the networks may actually reduce each
other’s access charges below marginal costs. Bill-
and-keep or even negative access charges could then
act as collusion devices.This result by Gans and King
(2001) turns the “Friends and Family” idea of dis-
crimination between on-net and off-net calls on its
head, because access charges below marginal costs
would lead to on-net usage prices above off-net
prices.In this case,subscribers will want to belong to
the smaller network. This softens competition for
subscribers.Thus,end-users are faced with low usage
prices and high subscription fees. It is not clear that
this specific behavior has any empirical relevance so
far, since subsidized subscription fees have been
common worldwide. However, it adds to the anti-
competitive effects that discrimination between on-
net and off-net calls can have.
Overall, the literature shows that discrimination
between on-net and off-net calls seems to have fewdesirable and many detrimental effects, largely
because it increases the market power of the domi-
nant firms. Disallowing it or restricting it to entrants
may therefore be a better policy than a regulated
interconnection charge tailored to it. In contrast,
DeGraba (2000b) argues that bill-and-keep will by
itself reduce the on-net/off-net discrimination issue.
Conclusions on the interconnection pricing models 
A major difference between optimal pricing under
one-way and two-way access is that one-way access
charges will not ordinarily be below incremental
costs, because the incumbent cannot make up the
difference downstream. In contrast, this matters less
under symmetric two-way access, because the low
access charges are both paid and received. Thus, in
the symmetric case, two-way access charges have
allocative but no direct budgetary effects. While
interconnection prices above marginal costs could be
socially optimal, regulated prices discussed in prac-
tice have been based on longrun average incremen-
tal costs or bill-and-keep. Reciprocity is required in
the US, but not so far in Germany.
In the US, competitive local exchange carriers
(CLECs) were initially afraid that they would have
much more outgoing than incoming traffic (due to
multiple lines of business customers, who would use
the CLECs for their outgoing traffic, but keep the
incumbent’s lines for incoming traffic).However,the
actual calling patterns were often reversed. These
experiences suggest that balanced calling patterns
are unrealistic and that competitors can target
selected customer groups. This can be due to sub-
scriber heterogeneity and/or the value of incoming
calls. Including the value of incoming calls has
recently started to impact the interconnection pric-
ing philosophy. The insight that each network can
charge its subscribers through fixed or usage fees for
the value of incoming calls has completely changed
the assessment of low interconnection charges or
even bill-and-keep, along with the accompanying
retail pricing methods and price structures.
What recommendations can regulators take from
the literature on two-way access pricing? The litera-
ture suggests differentiated approaches depending
on symmetries between incumbent and entrant, cus-
tomer heterogeneity, downstream pricing (and price
regulation) and the valuation of incoming calls.Such
differentiation in policy could itself have adverse
selection and moral hazard effects known as regula-
tory arbitrage because most of these variables are
endogenous.The question then is if there exist either
robust specific policies or general policies with suffi-
ciently good properties. In a fully regulated state,
COBAK could be such a winning policy if there
were only one to choose from.
General conclusions
While the focus of this article is on telecommunica-
tions, the principles it reviews could be relevant to
other networks depending upon their particular
characteristics. Electricity transmission grids, credit
card networks and railroad tracks can be bottleneck
facilities to which the one-way access model would
apply.In fact,Baumol (1983) first formulated his ver-
sion of the ECPR for a railroad example. Never-
theless,because many results in the literature are not
rebust to fairly small changes in the underlying
assumptions, a main lesson from our discussion is
that the applicability of theoretical results to policy
largely depends on the sector-specific properties
incorporated in the models.
The normative results suggest that, for one-way
access to bottleneck facilities, the two leading
approaches to regulation appear to be global price
caps or access price caps combined with deregulated
retail tariffs. These approaches could include an
imputation requirement related to the Baumol-
Willig rule. The article emphasizes that two-way
access is characterized by both potential exclusion
and potential collusion, largely depending on asym-
metries and on the type of downstream pricing.Since
for the interesting case of economies of scale in the
network, optimal interconnection charges could be
above or below marginal costs, there is no simple
optimal rule.
Taken together, this suggests that, in a system with
both one-way and two-way access, there might be
access price caps, possibly with two baskets, one for
one-way access and one for two-way access charges.
This could reduce some of the cost measurement
problems encountered, when basing access and
interconnection charges on costs and it reduces the
danger of premature deregulation of access and
interconnection. At the same time, retail could be
deregulated (possibly helped by a universal service
policy as a second policy instrument). However, the
consequences of price caps for two-way access need
to be analyzed first and compared to other regulato-
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ry options,such as the COBAK approach.Such com-
parison should include the effects on intermodal
competition, as bill-and-keep could improve the
competitiveness of traditional phone services against
Internet-based telephony. Further research is also
badly needed about nonlinear access and intercon-
nection charges, about asymmetries in interconnec-
tion and about the investment effects of different
access and interconnection regimes.
As in any area of active research perceived gaps fair-
ly quickly lead to new discoveries. The static
approach of the models has given way to new
dynamic approaches that emphasize entry and
investment decisions. The old insight that incoming
calls have value is finally bearing fruit in the two-way
access models. It yet needs to be fully appreciated in
the context of one-way access. For example, a local
exchange carrier, providing call termination services
to a long-distance carrier can benefit from the value
of incoming calls by being able to increase subscrip-
tion charges. It may thus have less of an interest in
high access charges that reduce the volume of
incoming calls. A similar incentive could hold for
originating access charges, which are passed on into
long-distance charges and therefore affect willing-
ness to pay for subscription.These observations sug-
gest that the FCC (2001) may be on the right track
by looking for a unified approach to one-way and
two-way access charges.
A final word on regulation and competition policy:
Access and interconnection price regulation is very
technical and requires an in-depth knowledge of the
industry. This favors industry-specific regulation
over antitrust agencies.However,as telecommunica-
tions competition matures, many of the technical
problems will have been solved routinely, so that
competition policy can take over.
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